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SQUARE WITH THE HOUSE: THE CASE FOR ENDING  
EX-OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
 
I.  Introduction 
From time to time and for a variety of reasons, people commit crimes.  This 
is, of course,  unavoidable in any system of justice.   Once the offender is  caught,  
convicted, and repays the harm he caused , he should be free to re-enter society 
and pursue a happy and productive l ife.  However, for many of the nearly 
600,000 incarcerated ex-offenders released each year in the United States , the 
path to reentry is permanently blocked because they are  excluded from many of 
the best employment opportunities based on nothing more than their criminal 
history.
1
  Without a chance at meaningful em ployment,  these ex-offenders will  
never fully reintegrate into society and will instead be transformed into an 
underclass of citizen.  Some may even perceive they have no option but to 
return to the criminal path that led them to  their conviction in the fi rst place to 
support  themselves.  
 This paper will  examine the reasons for and against  allowing employment 
discrimination against ex -offenders.  In Part II,  i t  will introduce the problem 
and the typical  players who are affected by the practice.  In Part  III,  it  will  lay 
out the analytical  framework describing how offenders should be punished, and 
will  explore why employment discrimination is both a common practice and a 
bad idea.  In Part  IV, the paper will  compare employm ent discrimination against  
                                                          
1
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ex-offenders to the practice of debarment .  Part V will explore past solutions 
that address ex-offender discrimination and attempts to reduce recidivism with 
employment, and why they have failed.  Part  VI will  then recommend new 
solutions, including outlawing employment discrimination, relying on employers 
to supervise ex-offender workers rather than the government, and creating an 
insurance program to reduce the risks that  employers face in hiring ex -offenders.  
Finally,  Part  VII will conclude by stating that  ex -offender discrimination must 
be outlawed if ex-offenders are ever to truly reintegrate and become functioning 
members of society.  
II.  An Illustrative Example  
 Larry Schanuel’s  criminal history appears to tell  the story of a m an who 
has had brushes with the law but has paid for his crimes.  In April  1963, he pled 
guilty to Second Degree Robbery and in July 1967, he pled guilty to a charge of 
Transferring Government Obligations.
2
  His parole period for those offenses  
expired in 1972.
3
  Apparently having repaid his debt to society,  Schanuel 
applied to the Allied National Detective Agency of Belleville, Il linois, seeking 
employment as a private detective.
4
  He was denied this opportunity because 
state law prohibited private detective agencies from employing “individuals who 
have been convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude unless ten years 
have passed from the discharge from any sentence imposed therefore.”
5
  This 
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meant that  Schanuel, regardless of how good a candidate he was, could not 
enjoy the benefits of such employment until at least 1982, ten years after he had 
served the entirety of his sentence.   
Unsatisfied with being relegated to a class of unemployable workers, 
Schanuel filed suit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals, 
alleging (among other things) that  the prohibition against hiring ex -offenders 
bore no rational relationship to a legitimate societal interest as required under 
the Due Process Clause of the 14
t h
 Amendment and a line of cases within the 
circuit holding that  “[licensing or employment] qualification standards must 
bear a rational relationship to the skills necessary for the job. ”
6
  Ultimately,  the 
Court  of Appeals for the 7
t h
 Circuit ruled against  the defendant and rejected the 
idea that a prior criminal history bore no rational relationship to the work 
performed by detectives.  The court supported its decision with the simple 
statement that  it  was “not unreasonable to suppose that  the public trust might be 




Rules that allow discrimination against  ex-offenders in employment are 
not uncommon throughout the nation.
8
  Not only are would-be private detectives 
discriminated against, but so too are dancehall  owners convicted of felonies,  
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 See, e.g., Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for 
Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People With Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18 (2005) 
(tracing an extensive list of cases and rationales that courts have used to justify rules excluding ex-




firefighters with a history of arson, and taxicab drivers who have a criminal 
history that suggests bad moral character , just to name a  few examples .
9
  As the 
practice of ex-offender discrimination is so widespread, i t  should follow that the 
reasons underpinning it are not just  based in “reason” and “common sense,” but 
are well rooted in actual fact and research that shows such discriminatory 
practices  are effective at  protecting the public and outweigh the harm inflicted 
against the ex-offenders.  In order to understand if they are effective or not  we 
must first understand how optimal punishments are determined.   
III.  The Costs and Benefits  of the Rule  
a.  A Starting Place: D = L / p  
On its simplest level, the punishment of crimes is a fa irly straightforward 
idea.   A criminal  seeks to do an act because it  will  benefit  him, but such  an act  
is deemed by society to be unacceptable  and is therefore forbidden by law.  
Take the simple example of a purse snatching: A criminal seeks the value of the 
contents of the purse, but society has an interest in keeping its cit izens free 
from robbery and violence.  Society will  pass laws criminalizing the act of p urse 
snatching and will assign a punishment sufficient to discourage individuals from 
becoming pursue snatchers .  As Judge Richard Posner explains, society must 
take into consideration various factors in order to determine the optimum value 
of the punishment (D), including the harm caused by the criminal (L) and the 
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probability of his being caught and made to pay ( p).
10




D = L / p  
 Other scholars have expanded on th is simple formula to include other 
variables in an attempt to make it  more comprehensive and useful, but for our 
purposes,
 
it  is sufficient in its current form.
11
  From time to time, society can 
amend D, depending on changes in L and p  (e.g.,  to represent the increasing 
losses from this sort of behavior or from advancements in law enforcement 
technology that make detection more likely,  respectively).   Even retributivists 
can insert  an amount to be paid before the offender has satisfied his debt by 
adding i t to the right side of the equation.   However, the one constant is that  
after D has been satisfied by the criminal (a fine paid or sentence served  in the 
event financial compensation is not possible or appropriate ), then no further 
action should follow because the socially optimal level of punishment has been 
achieved.  Any additional punishment  will have negative effects,  like over-
deterring behavior that is socially beneficial because it  is too close to  
punishable behavior, resulting in inefficiency.
12
  Posner illustrates this 
inefficiency with the example of a motorist  who gives up driving because the 
penalty for speeding is death .
 13
  The inefficiency occurs because  drivers will 
not drive at all in an attempt to avoid the penalty and society will lose the 
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benefits of travel  by car.
14
  In an employment case like Schanuel ’s ,  one can 
imagine that he would not confess to crimes , reveal them in employment  
applications or enter into plea agreements in the first place because the risk of 
punishment is so extreme that it  would preclude him from obtaining a reputable 
job for the next decade on top of his other punishment .  Thus, society would 
lose some of the benefits of plea bargaining (and a less expensive and more 
quickly resolved docket that comes with them) and honesty.    
 Why, then, impose a ten year prohibition on becoming a detective on  ex-
offenders l ike Schanuel if he has  already satisfied D by serving his sentence and 
parole?   
b. The Case for Discrimination  
 Posner suggests that the st igmatizing effect  of a criminal history may 
have some benefit to society and employers as it  represents a signal to thos e 
who would transact business with the criminal in the future.
15
 Courts like the 
one in Carlyle v.  Sit terson appear to have embraced this idea .
 16
  In Carlyle ,  the 
court supported the discharge of a firefighter upon learning of his convictions 
for arson.
17
  The court  rooted its decision in “common sense ,”  s tating:  
Common sense dictates that  in many instances,  the government must 
have authority to separate employees because of conduct occurring 
prior to the employment…This Court finds that any argument that  




 Id. at 281. 
16






the defendants acted   capriciously or arbitrarily in discharging the 
plaintiff from the fire department because he was a convicted 
arsonist to be totally devoid of merit.   … Not only must they 
consider the past record and character of their employees,  they must 
also seek to insure continued public confidence in government and 
the services it provides.
18
 
 The “common sense”  rationale advanced by this court and Posner 
appears to be that  since this person has committed a crime in the past ,  he 
has communicated his possible intent to commit crimes in the future if  
given the opportunity,  and therefore, employers should be allowed to 
avoid employing him.  Presumably, this will  save the expense of future 
similar crimes (L), and the related costs of prosecuting and punishing 
them. 
There is  some weight to this argument as most ex -offenders will  
commit crimes in the future.   For evidence we need only look as far as 
any of the numerous studies on recidivism.  One such study conducted by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics tracked the rele ase of nearly 300,000 
prisoners in 1994 (which accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total  
number of prisoners released that year) .
19
  Of those 300,000, 
approximately 67.5% were re -arrested within three years.
20
  Similarly, 
there are no shortage of studies on the state level that come to the same 
conclusion that  the majority of offenders recidivate in the first two or 




 Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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three years after release.
21
  Therefore,  we can safely conclude that an 
employer does,  in fact have a legitimate interest in protecting himself 
from ex-offenders as they are more likely than not to engage in criminal 
acts in the future .  
Another consideration for the potential  employer is  the threat  of 
being sued for negligent hiring, which can occur if  the employer knew or 
should have known that  his employee had propensit ies towards violence 
due to his criminal history and such violence resulted after the hiring .
22
  
Such liability has attached where an employer’s background check failed 
to uncover an ex-offender’s past  history of assault and burglary and a 
workplace sexual assault occurred after hiring .
23
  Though the court 
stressed that such l iability can be avoided without  banning all ex-offender 
employment, the common solution to avoiding this liability has simply 
been for employers to identify all  ex -offenders and disqualify them for 
employment at  the application stage  just to be on the safe side  (as long as 
and to the extent that  law permits such discrimination) .
24
 
c.  The Costs of Discrimination  
i . Purposeless Over-Internalization of  Consequences  
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The mere fact that  an ex-offender is  a riskier choice for his 
employer does not necessari ly mean that barring him from employment 
makes economic sense.  Take for example  the arsonist-turned-firefighter 
who would have been retained but for his past  arson.  Why should his 
prior act  of arson matter to his future employment with a fire department ?  
He already paid his debt to society for his arsons (D),  and so, he has not 
only reimbursed society for the cost of  his bad acts (L), but has paid an 
additional cost taking into account the unlikelihood he would be caught 
(p) .  Being a rational actor ,
 
he should be one of the least  likely individuals 
to attempt the same act again as he should have an exaggerated 
expectation of being caught based on his past experience.   It is of course 
tempting to argue that criminals are irrational actors (and that is why they 
commit crimes in the first place), but as Posner points out, the available 
empirical evidence shows that even cr iminals are rational actors , taking 
into account opportunity costs,  the probability of being caught,  and the 
severity of any potential  punishment .
25
  Therefore,  we can only conclude 
that society is engaging in over -deterrence and is forfeiting socially 
beneficial activities as Posner predicted because ex-offenders are being 
compelled to  suffer a loss greater than D.  
ii .  The Fear of Recidivism is Exaggerated  
The fear of recidivism is not a convincing argument for supporting 
a bar against these employees as far as safety to society is  concerned.  
                                                          
25
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While it is admittedly true that an ex -offender is more likely than not to 
commit a crime in the future,  there is no reason to believe that  denying 
the ex-offender employment opportunities will  reduce the risk of 
recidivism.  For example, the arsonists was not a firefighter before  his 
conviction and still  managed to commit the arson  that led to his removal .  
The same holds true for Larry Schanuel, whose crimes of fraud and 
robbery were committed without the aid of a detective’s license.  
In fact,  many commentators  believe that  discriminating against  ex -
offenders in employment actually increases the risk of recidivism.
26
  Some 
of these commentators observe that employment is good for ex -offenders,  
not only because it  provides for their survival by giving them a paycheck, 
but also because work promotes regular social  interaction, community 
involvement, increased self-esteem, and social control on the ex -offenders 
that will  reduce recidivism.
27
  Some researchers believe that  such 
opportunities for meaningful employment  actually reduce recidivism, 
becoming increasingly effective as the ex -offenders age.
28
  
At the very least, by p roviding the ex-offender with attractive 
employment opportunities,  the opportunity costs of forgoing them and 
instead choosing a life of crime increases, thereby making recidivism less 
likely.   Conversely,  denying employment opportunities would mean the 
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opportunity cost  for choosing a l ife of crime becomes less, and recidivism 
should go up.  
However, none of this means that an individual employer who hires 
an ex-offender is not taking a risk by doing so.  The news is replete with 
examples of how ex-offenders have harmed their employers  and 
coworkers.
29
  Thus, even though denying employment opportunities to ex-
offenders harms society as a whole (by increasing the total l ikelihood of 
recidivism), it  is rational  for the employer to engage in this practice 
because he does not fully internalize risks society  faces in general, but 
only those that  he himself has to absorb.  Put another way, the employer 
would rather have the ex-offender recidivate against his neighbor  
frequently than against his own interests even once.  
 
iii .  Discriminatory Tastes Are Always Expensive  
Employers who discriminate have tastes for or against  certain types 
of employees.  For example, an employer who refuses to hire ex -offenders  
has a taste favoring non-offenders .  Economists like Gary S. Becker have 
found that  employers who discriminate based on tast e are increasing their 
own cost , either because they are willing to endure reduced incomes or 
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pay more for the same quantity and quality of labor .
30
  To illustrate 
Becker’s theories, suppose that the entire workforce consists of two 
groups, E (ex-Offenders) and N (non-offenders) , who are perfect 
substi tutes (in this scenario,  this means that  an employer has no merit  
based reason to prefer one group over the other).
31
  In the equilibrium 
marketplace, with no discrimination, the wages paid  to these workers 
would be equal .  However, if some employers have a taste for N (such 
taste represented by d),  the wages (W) they are willing to pay to N 
increase.  This increase represents the amount that the discriminating 
employers are willing to pay to avoid transacting with their disfavored 
group.
32
  The inefficient wage is represented by the equation W N  = W(1 + 
d).  Similarly,  if the market as a whole contains many employers with a 
similar or greater taste preference, then the prevailing wages paid to non-
offenders can be expected to increase further.  Since the wages are higher,  
the quantity of the products the employer produces is reduced  because the 
employer’s costs of production are increased .  This harms the employer as 
his net revenues are reduced.  This harms the society as the total level of 
production is less than the non-discriminatory equilibrium, resulting  in 
fewer products and higher prices.   Too see why,  consider the following  
graph representing a labor market in which discrimination has increased 
costs:  
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Here we see employers have absorbed an additional cost of 
production, in this case, the inflated wage caused by discrimination.  This 
increase in costs shifted the supply of whatever product the employer 
produced from S to S’, which resulted in both higher prices (P’) and  
lower quanti ty supplied (Q’) than would otherwise be available had the 
market operated in equilibrium (where P=Q).  Hence, we see that society 
has suffered as a whole because it has to make do with less and pay mor e 
as a result of discrimination .  However,  the employers do not just suffer  
because society in general suffers  but because their total  revenues are 






Here, we see that  even though employer s are able to charge a higher 
price (now at point P’) for the  products or services supplied, they still  
lose out overall  as their total revenue (the shaded rectangle on the right 
diagram) is now smaller than if they did not discriminate at all,  sold at a 
lower price, and sold more units.  Therefore, both employers a nd society 
suffer as a direct result of discriminatory hiring practices.  
Such discriminatory practices also harm the discriminated against 
party because, obviously,  they are not hired or are hired only at reduced 
wages compared to their counterparts.  Surprisingly,  even the preferred 
group may be harmed because the employers are less ab le to hire workers 
because the marginal cost  of hiring them is  higher,  and employers will  
only hire workers until marginal cost equals their marginal product.  Thus, 
discrimination ultimately leads the employer to pay increased marginal 
costs for labor, produce less, and sell at  higher prices, leaving everyone 




In many markets, discrimination is  at least  partially controlled by 
the fact  that  an employer who engages in discrimination puts himself at  a 
comparative disadvantage to those employers  who do not have as high a d-
value.  This is  because the groups that  do not discriminate as much face 
lower marginal costs, and can expand more quickly compared to their 
more discriminatory counterparts.
33
  However, in the labor market,  this 
counteractive force  on ex-offenders is minimized if not eliminated 
entirely because there is often an expectation  or requirement  imposed on 
employers that forces them to engage in discriminatory practices.  This 
can be in the form of a law that  requires discrimination as was the case 
with Schanuel’s  detective licensing.  Alternatively,  social  norms and 
expectations can create this discriminatory requirement ,  as when the 
Carlyle  court observed that the government “must” ensure public 
confidence and “must” take into account a firefighter ’s past  involvement 
in an arson.  Even if an employer would not have a comparatively low d -
value, he would be required to increase his to the market’s d as it  is  
expected or required of him.  Therefore,  employers are particularly likely 
to engage in discrimination against  ex-offenders as there is  no advantage 
in not doing so.  
IV.  Searching for an Analogy: Debarment 
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Since there was no period in which the  labor market was entirely 
free from the ancient tradition of ex -offender discrimination,
34
 it  is  not 
possible to find conclusive evidence that its absence will be beneficial or 
not, even if economic theory suggests that it  should be.  However,  
evidence is available that suggests a similar practice, debarment,  does 
have the negative discriminatory effects that economic analysis would 
suggest .  
Debarment refers to when certain individuals or organizations are 
made ineligible to receive government contracts after engaging in 
prohibited conduct  l ike fraud, waste,  or abuse .
35
  Such a scheme closely 
parallels employment discrimination in general because after conviction 
of a crime, employers will not hire ex -offenders, in effect  “debarring” 
them from future employment opportunities .  Therefore, lessons learned 
from studying the effects of debarment should be instructive as to the 
effects we can expect from ex -offender discrimination.
36
 
Researchers have found that debarment is a preferable method to 
incarceration because it is  less expensive than administering f ines and 
imprisonment.
37
  This is because debarment does not require the state to 
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pay for the holding and care of a prisoner  or provide for  the collection of 
fines,  but instead diminishes the offender’s future earnings  (by denying 
them access to contracts they otherwise may have been awarded),  which 
itself acts like a deterrent . The additional debarment deterrent eliminates 
or at least reduces the total fine and incarceration period necessary to 
achieve any given level of deterrence.
38
  Debarment itself can even act  as 
a type of shaming, discrediting the target in the community,  and therefore 
is a form of free punishment which costs the state virtually nothing yet  
still  acts to deter offenders.   Finally,  the Supreme Court  has held that  
debarment is a consti tutionally permissible practice.
39
 
However,  any system uti lizing debarment has drawbacks.   First,  the 
effect of debarment is progressive ,  so it  will  punish some offenders more 
than others even though they committed the same crime.   Research has 
shown that the higher the income the offender had prior to the debarment,  
the more painful the penalty because the amount of lost future earnings 
increases dramatically.
40
  For offenders with more limited income 
potential, the deterrent effect of debarment is far diminished and is  
unlikely to effectively prevent future bad conduct .
41
  Such a “punish  the 
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wealthy” effect is  a perversion  of justice because offenders committing 
the same offense “pay” different penalties.
42
 
Also, by allowing the community to take into account the offender’s 
reputation, the offender may be permanently disadvantaged and suffer a 
lifelong loss of income potential.  Research has shown that the loss of 
income is more than what can be  accounted for by the loss of experience 
caused by the offender’s period of exclusion from the marketplace, which 
strongly suggests an enduring stigmatizing effect, depressing the ex -
offender’s  future earnings.
43
  This effect  can continue unti l the end of the 
offender’s life, and therefore,  would greatly exceed the  optimal penalty (a 
higher fine or additional incarceration) the offender would have otherwise 
been required to serve.  
Thus, we see that  al lowing a stigma attach to an offender is  both 
unjust and economically unwise because it al lows enhanced penalties for 
well-to-do offenders and because its potential harm to the offender can far  
exceed the optimal level of damages the of fender is expected to pay.  Any 
system that  al lows discrimination based on reputation, including ex -
offender employment discrimination, should not be utilized in a society 
that  favors equal treatment of offenders and punishment that is  
proportional to the injury inflicted.   
V.  Past Attempts to Correct the Problem 
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The problem of ex-offender employment discrimination is by no 
means a new one, and legislation has frequent ly been passed to address it .   
Just a few of the prior examples of ex -offender employment programs 
include the Baltimore Living Insurance for Ex-Prisoners (LIFE) program, 
the Transitional Aid Research Project (TARP), Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA), and the Job Corp.
44
  These programs attempted to reduce 
recidivism through gainful employment using a wide range of strategies  
and evaluation methodologies .  Some, like Job Corp, consisted of 
residential programs that emphasized vocational training of  some 60,000 
ex-offenders aged 16-24 drawn from throughout the country.
45
  Others, 
like TARP, focused on just 4,000 ex-offenders in two states where 
employment enrollment assistance was provided.
46
  Still  others,  like LIFE, 
merely provided financial  support  to ex-offenders to see what would 
happen.
47
  Despite their different strategies and methods, a l l of these 
programs boiled down to the same conclusion in the end  - not one of them 




 The most obvious reason as to why these  employment-based 
initiatives failed to reduce recidivism is that they failed to address the  
underlying cause of unemployment caused recidivism –  i .e. ,   
                                                          
44
 For a detailed description of each program, Visher, supra  note 26, at 304 
45
 Id. at 304. 
46
 Id. at 301. 
47
 Id. at 300. 
48




discrimination.  None of the studies l isted above prohibited employer 
discrimination, nor addressed the risks empl oyers face when hiring ex -
offenders.  Without addressing these underlying causes of the problem, 
there is little reason to believe that  any amount of aid given to ex -
offenders in the form of training, financial support, or job placement 
assistance will  reduce recidivism.  
VI.  Suggested Solutions  
a.  The Two-Pronged Approach 
In order for any employment -based anti-recidivism program to be 
effective it must both prohibit employer discrimination  against ex-
offenders and mitigate the risk employers face from hiring ex -offenders.    
A two-prong statutory scheme that first prohibits employment 
discrimination based on ex-offender status,  including the mere inquiry 
into such status,  and second insures the employer  to help offset  the harm 
that  employers face when an employed  ex-offender recidivates and causes 
harm to him would be effective in addressing this problem . 
 The most obvious means of prohibiting ex -offender employment 
discrimination is simply to make it  illegal.  This can be accomplished by 
simply adding the term “ex -offender status” to the list of enumerated 
protected classes in existing anti-discrimination statutes such as those that 
already protect against discrimination based on race,  sex, color religion, 






  Some states have already moved in this direction, the 
most notable being Wisconsin  which is currently considered to offer both 
the simplest and strongest  protections for ex -offenders.
50
  The statutory 
scheme in Wisconsin, at least  on its  face, prohibits all use of criminal 
histories or arrest records , and even the act of inquiring about the 
existence of such records,  by both private and public employers making 
employment or licensing decisions just  as it  prohibits discrimination 
based on age, race, creed, color, disabil ity, marital status, sex, national 
origin,  ancestry,  and a number of other protected classes.
51
  However,  it  
specifically exempts all  ex-offender discrimination in which the employer 
can show the ex-offender’s previous offenses are of a type that  
“substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular  job or licensed 
activity,” or if i t  is  a job that requires fidelity bonding that cannot be 
obtained without a criminal history check.
52
  Furthermore, the legislature 
also allows discrimination on a long l ist of enumerated crimes, from 
failing to register for selected service  to the unlawful manufacture of 
controlled substances.
53
  Thus, while founded on the right idea of 
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protecting ex-offenders from employment discrimination, the exceptions  
eviscerate the law’s  potential.  
 Suppose, however,  that  such a scheme were enacted without any of 
the exceptions.  In such a situation, employers would hire ex-offenders as 
often as they would hire identically qualified non-offenders because they 
would have no reason not to (and would be prohibited from seeking such a 
reason).  As a result, recidivism would be expected to drop because, as 
mentioned earlier,  ex-offenders can obtain legal means for their survival 
by receiving paychecks instead of needing to turn to crime  for support  and 
because work promotes regular social interaction, community involvement,  
increased self-esteem, and social contro l over the ex-offenders.
54
  As 
recidivism decreases, society saves as it  pays for fewer trials and 
detentions, as well as the corresponding salaries of judges,  police officers, 
and other employees who are no longer needed as the total amount of 
crime declines - a significant consideration in a $228 bill ion per  year 
industry.
55
  Furthermore, even in the unlikely event that recidivism rates 
did not fall, society would still  benefit  as a whole because with more 
workers in the labor market,  the wage demanded for each worker falls  and 
employers, faced with reduced costs, will  be able to produce more goods 
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and services, resulting in Figure 1 operati ng in reverse as i t  approaches 
equilibrium.  
 Employers fearing negligent hiring suit s should also benefit  under 
the proposed legislation.  As discussed earlier, an element of negligent 
hiring is having known or should have known of an individual’s 
propensity for criminal acts, and failing to search a criminal history can 
give rise to a negligent hiring suit .
56
  Under the proposed statutory scheme, 
however,  this fear should be eliminated because an employer is prohibited  
by law from knowing or even inquiring about ex -offender status.  Thus, an 
employer cannot be held liable for hiring an ex-offender.  
 Despite all the potential  benefits  of the proposed statutory scheme, 
it  is certain that recidivism will st ill  be a problem.  Even if i t  diminishes,  
there is no authority that  suggests that  it  will  be eliminated entirely.   
Further,  it  stands to reason that an ex-offender who recidivates will do so 
locally,  or to those around him, and his employment means he will  often 
have a close proximity to his employer and coworkers.  Therefore,  
employers have a legitimate fear of an ex -offender committing crimes 
against him, or at least that affect him or his other worker’s productivity,  
and therefore will st ill  not want to hire the ex -offender.  However, this 
risk exists whether the employer hires the offender or not and whether or 
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not there is a law prohibiting ex -offender discrimination.  An arsonist, for 
example,  who is l ikely to repeat his offense due to some internal 
propensity to destroy may choose to destroy a building belonging to his 
employer.  However,  even if he is unemployed, he will destroy someone’s  
building if he recidivates,  and the chances of the target being one of those 
of interest to the employer are significantly diluted as  there is less reason 
to expect the ex-offender will  be spending much of his time near the 
employer.  However, the loss to society is the same –  a building is lost.  
The only difference between the proposed scheme and the current pro -
discrimination schemes currently in force are that the employers are 
permitted to try to protect themselves by reducing the chance that the 
building in question will be of value to them.  
 If  the employer were required to hire ex -offenders, it  stands to 
reason that such destroyed buildings would be far fewer.   For one thing, 
as mentioned before,  the employed ex-offender has less free time in which 
to plot and carry out his criminal agenda as more of his time is consumed 
by the employer.  Similarly,  he will  be less likely to recid ivate for the 
other reasons mentioned above, such as his reconne ction with the 
community and an increased imposition of societal  control on his behavior,  
again resulting in fewer burned buildings.   Finally,  if the ex -offender 
were employed, he would be supervised and monitored by an interested 
party –  the employer –  who does not want the ex-offender to destroy his 




anyway to ensure productivi ty and to provide them instructions,  so the 
incremental cost of this additional monitoring should be negligible .  The 
currently available alternative would be for a disinterested  parole officer  
to conduct similar monitoring.  The parole officer is  disinterested in the 
sense that  he neither owns the  resources that the ex-offender would 
destroy or steal should he recidivate,  nor does he s pend prolonged periods 
of time around the ex-offender (certainly not a traditional 40 hour week  of  
supervision the ex-offender would receive in a typical work week wi th his 
employer).    
 Since society has saved through reduced recidivism (including the 
costs of the corresponding lit igation, imprisonment, and disruption to 
society from criminal activity) and the diminished need to maintain parole 
and supervising functions over released ex-offenders as this cost is shifted  
to employers,  society would be able to redirect  a portion of their savings 
into an insurance program for employers who suffer harm by recidivating 
ex-offenders.  Such a program would reduce or el iminate  the risk that 
employers faced from hiring ex -offenders, and would diminish their taste 
for discrimination against this riskier class of workers  as they become a 
safer choice. Even with these insurance payments, society would be better  
off financially because the total amount of payment would be less than the 
losses society would have suffered had employers remained able to 
discriminate.  




There are two likely arguments that would be made in opposit ion to the 
proposed two-prong solution.  First, the “common sense” notion  that  ex-
offenders should not be given the means to commit their crimes again and 
second, the idea that ex-offenders are “unworthy” to receive the same 
protections as other,  legit imately disadvantaged groups.  
Proponents of the “common sense” approach would argue that  
preventing ex-offender employment discrimination  only multipl ies the 
harm ex-offenders do by giving them access to the means to commit the 
crimes they have already shown themselves will ing to commit.   
Continuing with our familiar example, this would mean that we would 
expect  to see ex-arsonist  firefighters allowing fires to burn or even 
feeding them if we did not al low employers to prevent such ex -offenders 
from serving as firefighters.  I have been able to locate no evidence to 
show that this theory is rooted in any studies.   Instead, the notion appears 
to be premised on “common sense”  wisdom of the sort that  taught us that 
heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones .   Admittedly,  there is  a certain 
distasteful reaction to giving ex -murderers guns when they become police 
officers,  or allowing ex-child molesters from serving as kindergarten 
teachers,  but should there be such a reaction? 
In many cases, the answer is no.  The ex -murderer, if he is unfit to 
reenter society or otherwise has not repaid  the optimal level of damages  
(D),  would not have been released from his incarceration to serve as a 




necessary.  If he has  repaid the optimal level of damages, then we should 
treat the ex-offender as if he has fully internalized the consequences of 
his actions as we presume people are rational in making our social 
policies.
57
  In the event his actions were so vile that no single person 
could fully internalize the action, such a person would never be released 
from incarceration  as his D value would be too high to repay.  As for 
those who are not rational  actors (that  is, even if they pay D, they will  
still  commit the same offensive conduct), it  is arguable that i t  is better to 
place them with an employer than to leave them at  large, where they have 
already demonstrated an ability to commit their offensive a cts. For 
example,  research suggests that for some offenders,  a biological  
predisposition compels them to commit  certain crimes, and therefore, they 
are unable to internalize D and change their behavior.
 58
  For this 
relatively small  group of individuals,  i t  would be better to have them 
reenter society under the watchful eye of an employer, who already has an 
interest in monitoring his employees ’  behavior,  than to simply release him 
into the population at large, monitored only by a disinterested parole 
officer in an overworked off ice,  or in many cases, by no one at  all .  
Finally,  there are any number of reasons that  an ex -offender committed 
his original  crime which would no longer apply should he find 
employment, but would apply if he continued to lack lawful employment.   
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An ex-robber, for example,  who stole to support  himself or his family 
would have less reason to commit the act  again if  he was l awfully 
employed.  However, if  he is  released and cannot find employment due to 
his criminal history,  he would be placed back in th e same, and perhaps 
worse, position he occupied when he made his choice to rob in the past.   
The other possible argument against a prohibit ion on ex-offender 
employment discrimination is that  ex -offenders are unworthy of 
employment discrimination protection.  Such an argument has been raised 
against the already l imited protections provided under state laws l ike the 
Wisconsin prohibitions detailed above.
59
  Arguing that the existing 
limitations on Wisconsin’s protections are not enough, at  least  one 
commentator advocated abolishing all  ex-offender’s  employment 
discrimination  protection since as a prior criminal,  such individua ls are 
“unworthy” of protection.
60
  The ex-offender is unlike other protected 
classes because the other classes are discriminated again st based on 
factors outside their control , such as race or gender.
61
  I would argue that 
such a criticism is improper because as a society,  we should not punish an 
individual who has paid his debt to society,  nor should we endorse the 
suggestion that some people are simply less deserving of gainful 
employment because they have made mistakes in their past.   It  would be 
fundamentally unfair to hold a past crime, for which the ex -offender has 
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already paid, against  an ex -offender in important aspects of his life,  like 
employment,  forever.  Allowing such treatment would convert all  ex -
offenders into a permanent underclass of cit izens, unworthy of 
employment, deprived of opportunities that  would reduce their chances of 
escaping their life of crime.   
VII.  Conclusion 
Without adopting serious reforms that prohibit  discrimination against 
ex-offenders in employment, ex -offenders will  continue to recidivate, 
society will continue to pay an economically  inefficient premium to avoid 
hiring them, and the problem of recidivism will continue.  Even though 
employing ex-offenders represents a risk to the employer , it  is clear that 
the offender will  be likely to recidivate in any event against  someone,  and 
society will be better  off with the additional control it  will  have over an 
employed ex-offender rather than one at large. At the very least, if the 
employer hires the ex-offender, recidivism would be less likely due to the 
imposit ion of social  control, the closer eye the employer would use than 
the government, and the lawful alternatives to crime the ex -offender 
would have available.  Therefore,  it  is  in society’s,  the ex -offender’s,  and 
the employer’s long-term interests that the ex-offender be free to seek 
meaningful employment unimpeded by discrimination so that he can make 
valuable contributions to society again.   
